Iran-Israel War and Kremlin’s Strategic Imperatives in the Region | Bakshinder Singh Bhatia

Keywords: Ceasefire, Iran, Israel, Foreign Policy

On 24th June, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between Iran and Israel, bringing the twelve-day war between the nations to a stop. The war started in the early hours of June 13 with Israel launching a successful surprise attack named Operation Rising Lion with decapitation strikes against senior IRGC officials and nuclear scientists. These strikes were accompanied by the deployment of covert operational assets including one way attack drones; short range propellant rockets and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM’s) and explosives clandestinely smuggled into Iran for saboteur operations in the following days. This led to the systematic targeting of Iran’s air defence systems, incapacitating radars and missile batteries. The stated goal of the operation was the neutralisation of Iran’s latent nuclear capabilities in Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow uranium enrichment plants.

After recuperating its air defence systems Iran launched a retaliatory strike on Israel, named True Promise 3 (TP3) penetrating missile defence layers by a significant number targeting many high value targets. This protracted war between both countries was followed by a direct US attack on Iran claiming ‘obliteration’ of uranium enrichment power plants. Though the claims of destruction of nuclear sites are challenged by media reports in Israel and USA, the attack gave enough manoeuvrability space to call for an “end to the mission” by the US President claiming ceasefire. US attacks were followed by the Iranian retaliation strikes on US Al-Ubeid base in Qatar with ballistic missiles without any critical damage inferring both Iranian and Americans unwillingness to wage a total war of destruction on each other. 

Even with the ceasefire, the existential nature of the conflict has not withered away and the fundamental contradictions between the warring parties remain. One of the overlooked factors in the US, Israel, and Iran tango has been Russia’s balancing act on its southern underbelly.

In his meeting with Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi since the ceasefire, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the US airstrikes on Iranian Uranium enrichment facilities as “unprovoked” and “unjustifiable aggression”.

Importantly, along with the Russian President, foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and Yuri Ushakov, advisor to the president of Russia on Foreign policy, the closed-door meeting was attended by vice-Admiral Igor Kostyukov, head of the intelligence directorate of Russia’s General Staff, implying both sides having significant military discussions in line with the strategic cooperation partnership signed between Russia and Iran in January 2025. 

Consequently, Araghchi landed in Turkmenistan before making his way back to Tehran, acknowledging the criticality of the Caspian Sea region for maritime connectivity between Iran and Russia. The Turkmenbashi port in Turkmenistan has been the main loading and unloading point for Russia’s supply to Iran, and the country has been the end point of rail shipments of cargo and arms from China and North Korea. 

Additionally, though Russia has been a strict adherent of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, vis-à-vis Iran, direct attacks from the USA on Iranian enrichment sites and implied intent at regime change have rendered earlier affirmations flexible. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the security council of the Russian Federation, remarked in his 10-point Telegram post about the potential emergence of an ultra-nationalistic nuclear weapon state. Making a radical departure, this was the first statement from a senior Russian official about the possible “nuclearization” of Iran in the face of existential threats from the US and Israel, revealing a public surfacing of varied assessments in the Russian political and military circles due to US, Israeli attacks on Iran. 

Though Russia and Iran have tried to develop strong defence relations in recent years, their partnership still faces many challenges.

According to media reports Iranian Defence Minister Aziz Nazirzadeh initiated the procurement of Chengdu J-10C fighter jets and advanced AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) equipment from China at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) defence ministers meeting.

Russia’s inability to provide two dozen SU-35s to Iran, even after securing a deal in 2023, made Tehran reorient its defence strategy away from Moscow. Even their security interests in the region often dissect with each other. Russian unwillingness to operate its air defence systems in Syria against Israeli air strikes led to the gradual withering away of state military capabilities. This policy of passiveness and non-engagement by Russia was seen in Iran as a tacit encouragement for Israel to bomb Syrian lands, eventually leading to the loss of diligently cultivated strategic depth over the years in the region. 

Moreover, the intricate nature of the treaty text between Russia and Iran gives enough space for subjective interpretations to both countries. Firstly, the terms “war,” “armed invasion” and “attack” are not mentioned in the treaty, while the term “cooperation” appears seventy-one times in treaty text. This is a sharp contrast to Russia’s treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership with North Korea which explicitly states to provide “military and other assistance with all means in the possession without delay” in a state of war. Secondly, Article 3(3) and 3(4) of the treaty text painstakingly mentions that both sides should not help either sides adversary in a conflict situation and should not permit their territories in support of a hostile action against each other. Thirdly, Iranian government has been cautious of historical mutual suspicion and over reach by Tsarist Russia and Soviet Union on their northern territories in the past making the dictum of strategic independence a central point in the foreign policy discourse. Although the late Iranian president Ibrahim Raisi tried pivoting towards Asia with his “look east policy”, his successor President Masoud Prezeshkian, belonging to the reformist camp had shown his keenness to develop trade relations with the west, and lifting of the sanctions.

Lastly there are around two million Russian speaking people in Israel forming 15% of total population, this gives vigorous undercurrent to Russian Israeli bilateral relations and Putin’s personal Philosemitism. Thus, Iranian posturing towards Russia will continue to be influenced by tacit Russian Israeli “understanding” in the region.   

 

Furthermore, US actions in West Asia will force operational and strategic changes in the Russian-Ukrainian battlespace. The pace of the Russian westward offensive in Ukraine was tempered by Putin’s calculation of negotiating a deal directly with US President Donald Trump, something which the previous US administrations have been unwilling to do. Thus, Russian recalibrations vis-à-vis Europe and USA are keenly observed by Tehran. 

The heart of the matter is that, as Iran and Israel rearm and regroup, bypassing an already crumbling ceasefire, it remains to be seen how much more wiggle room Russia has left for its balancing act between the two eschatological nations engaged in an existential war with one another. 

About the Author: Bakshinder Singh Bhatia is currently pursuing his PhD on “Indo-China Maritime Relations” and is working as a Blog Analyst for Social Legal Review of Marginalised and Conflict Studies (SLRMC). He is also a freelance writer primarily focusing on West Asia.

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