Social media in the twenty-first century has an undeniable presence in every individual’s life across age groups. To borrow from Althusser, social media sites function as an ‘ideological state apparatus’ wherein there is a constant production of ‘subjects’ who seem to be trapped in their false emancipatory potential. It produces the subject through ‘capturing interpellation’[1] wherein individuals on social media are compelled to capture every moment in life as a documentation of their ‘performativity’[2], taking individuals as ‘always already subjects’[3] to a whole new level. Social media platforms have become a norm for determining one’s moral worth and self-identity. This article aims to study the materiality of social media sites and how such sites determine the moral worth and self-identity of individuals today. The article aims not to vilify social media or its culture but to expose the power it holds to alter behaviour traits among people, leading to the subjectification of individuals in its web of false consciousness. To validate the arguments, Axel Honneth’s framework of recognition and Nancy Fraser’s analytical distinction between recognition and redistribution have been used. Honneth’s framework of ‘recognition’ rests on the normative foundation of social relations of individuals wherein humans are relational beings. If one’s moral worth is determined by social relations, then a platform like Instagram or Facebook should be seen as sacrosanct in determining one’s self-identity and moral worth in the contemporary age of social media. Contrary to popular belief, social media sites are often platforms for ‘seriality’[4] which is mistaken by people for solidarity and friendship. Despite such shortcomings, there is an affinity towards being a part of social media and I shall explore this through Critical Theory.
This article will analyse how Honneth’s framework of ‘recognition’[8] helps one explore the influence of these social media platforms in the construction of moral worth and self-identity. Even though these platforms could be the cause of moral injury because of hate comments, hate speech, body shaming, and bullying all of which ‘add insult to injury’[9] there is a great affinity towards being a part of the platforms.
Social Media is seen by many as one, a source of liberation and two, a tool that dictates certain behavioural traits. It also gives some semblance of ‘recognition’ which is elaborated by Hegelian Marxists like Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth. Honneth’s recognition framework provides a useful lens for examining the dynamics of determining moral worth and self-identity in the age of social media. This framework emphasises the role of ‘mutuality and reciprocity’[5] which makes self-realisation inescapably linked to others. These sites facilitate ‘intersubjective recognition’[6] providing a democratised space to build on one’s ‘self-esteem.’[7] This article will analyse how Honneth’s framework of ‘recognition’[8] helps one explore the influence of these social media platforms in the construction of moral worth and self-identity. Even though these platforms could be the cause of moral injury because of hate comments, hate speech, body shaming, and bullying all of which ‘add insult to injury’[9] there is a great affinity towards being a part of the platforms. Social interaction on these platforms does not always adhere to ‘desirable features’[10] from the ‘moral point of view’[11].
Honneth’s framework is limited to face-to-face interaction while on social media anonymous fake profiles also cause real-time moral injury to the subjects on social media sites. In real life, one does not have the option to block people who cause moral injury. At the same time, one could address issues and confront people face-to-face in real-time mutual interactions while this is not the case on social media sites which is alienating.
To understand this strange affinity, I shall be borrowing Fraser’s ‘redistribution-recognition’ framework to validate Honneth’s framework of ‘recognition’. Scholars have noted, “What characterizes Taylor’s and Honneth’s recognition theories is that they are dual in the sense that they focus on individuals’ as well as on social struggles for recognition.”[12] Both Taylor and Honneth being Hegelian Marxists base their arguments on the premise that the process of mutual recognition is fundamental for humans to build their identity and self-consciousness. To determine one’s ‘authentic sense of self’[13], recognition is vital to human beings. Therefore, misrecognition or the lack of recognition can cause serious moral injury to a person’s sense of self. Honneth’s conception of recognition goes beyond Taylor’s ‘universal legal recognition (respect)’[14]. In his work, ‘The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts’[15], he adds, recognition is to do with love and friendship to build self-confidence, universal equal treatment based on Kantian notions resting on law and civil society to build self-respect, and the recognition of unique contributions of an individual to build self-esteem. A lack of self-respect, self-esteem, and self-confidence can cause moral injury and misrecognition. Although the Honnethian framework proves useful in analysing moral worth and self-identity through intersubjective social interaction it is not adequate to address the kinds of moral injuries faced on social media sites. Honneth’s framework is limited to face-to-face interaction while on social media anonymous fake profiles also cause real-time moral injury to the subjects on social media sites. In real life, one does not have the option to block people who cause moral injury. At the same time, one could address issues and confront people face-to-face in real-time mutual interactions while this is not the case on social media sites which is alienating. Hence the question of anonymity further heightens anxieties among subjects adding another dimension to the cause of moral injury.
Social media sites also blur the public-private divide making every question of misrecognition or the lack of recognition a political one wherein injustices are addressed and spoken about freely on such sites. Movements like the Me Too were entirely driven by social media wherein solidarity was seen in experiencing moral injury among women and other sexual minorities.
Social media sites also blur the public-private divide making every question of misrecognition or the lack of recognition a political one wherein injustices are addressed and spoken about freely on such sites. Movements like the Me Too were entirely driven by social media wherein solidarity was seen in experiencing moral injury among women and other sexual minorities. Such movements are a testament to the fact that questions of injustices are addressed through such sites.[16] Asef Bayat in his book Life as Politics writes that ‘ordinary people make meaningful change through everyday actions’[17] and social media sites provide a platform for meaningful change through such movements. But such instances are rather rare while everyday practices on social media do more harm to one’s self-confidence and self-esteem than provide a platform to address injustices. Even movements like Me Too were criticised for hushing down the voices of other sexual minorities like the LGBTQIA community, and in the Indian context, the experiences of Dalit Women were not adequately addressed.[18] Some feminist scholars[19] even addressed the dangers of lists like that of Raya Sarkar, which did not follow due process leading to moral injury of those who were falsely accused. Such instances complicate the question of recognition, wherein recognition of one group identity could lead to the misrecognition of another.
Every practice is simultaneously economic and cultural although not in equal proportions. Culture in the age of social media is less of an adherence to one’s own and more of mimicry of the other. In this process of mimesis, there is a loss of authenticity of the individual self in their identification which facilitates subject formation.
What makes social media platforms even more complex to examine is the fact that they are not just platforms facilitating interactive subjectivity but are also tools of surveillance for the state, a workplace for influencers, and a space for marketing and promotion. The ‘materiality’ or the internal logic of social media operates on economy and culture. To borrow from Fraser, in modern societies, economy and culture are differentiated or empirically divergent. She states that there is a ‘partial decoupling of the economic mechanisms of distribution from the structures of prestige.’[20] She also goes on to reiterate that economy and culture are ‘co-primary’ meaning that they are practically intertwined and interpenetrating structures. Therefore, the Honnethian framework in Fraser’s eyes becomes subject to culturalism.[21] Every practice is simultaneously economic and cultural although not in equal proportions. Culture in the age of social media is less of an adherence to one’s own and more of mimicry of the other. In this process of mimesis, there is a loss of authenticity of the individual self in their identification which facilitates subject formation. Hence the Honnethian framework of ‘self-esteem’ could lose ground on such sites. It operates in the ‘empty homogenous time’ wherein subjects are homogenised and atomised while being embedded in a social network.
The individual can, for the first time, envision themselves as this disembodied ‘other’ which becomes open to interpretation for other subjects. The individual’s perception of the image of themselves is then somewhere lost in its interaction with other subjects who comment, like, and share these images. The images of the ‘self’ become a property of these media sites and are no longer just an expression of oneself.
A subscription to any of these social media platforms (Facebook or Instagram) requires creation of a personal profile. This is equivalent to the Lacanian mirror stage wherein an individual creates a sense of self through images and ‘captions.’ The individual can, for the first time, envision themselves as this disembodied ‘other’ which becomes open to interpretation for other subjects. The individual’s perception of the image of themselves is then somewhere lost in its interaction with other subjects who comment, like, and share these images. The images of the ‘self’ become a property of these media sites and are no longer just an expression of oneself. The larger implication of such a practice is the access to these images by the ‘panopticon male connoisseur’[22] present in the eye of social media sites. While one may experience a sense of liberty while determining their sense of self through the images an individual conscientiously curates of themselves or others in their life, one fails to recognise that one has consented to access these images by other people and the State. Feldman suggests that “state power becomes a ‘blind spot’ in the redistribution/recognition framework that, while decisively rejecting Marx’s reduction of civil society to capitalism, has maintained Marx’s prioritization of civil society over state.”[23] Feldman claims, and I agree, that the state needs to be seen as “a crucial source of oppression and hardship in itself.”[24] The ambiguity of laws governing and addressing injustices perpetrated on these social media sites is on purpose. This is advantageous to the state as it can use such sites for surveillance sitting at the eye of the panopticon. Resistance through social media could feel counter-hegemonic but it is quite the contrary. It falls right into the lap of state surveillance which examines the choices, beliefs, and values of the people and ensures governmentality.[25]
The images posted by individuals then become subject to comments, likes, and shares which may enable an individual to experience joy momentarily because of intersubjective interaction. It presents the interpellated subjects with some semblance of ‘participative parity’[26] or the ability of individuals to participate as equals. This also enables ‘mutual recognition’[27], which in turn facilitates ‘intersubjective recognition.’[28] The affinity towards these social media sites can also be attributed to access to capital and redistribution. Despite experiencing hate comments which cause moral injury to individuals, people sign up for social media sites in greater numbers. If “every moral injury represents an act of personal harm”[29], then why are individuals drawn to such platforms? This is where Fraser’s redistribution-recognition framework comes into play. Fraser distinguishes redistribution and recognition in a structural framework for heuristic and analytical purposes. She posits that this analytical distinction is important to understand where these two dimensions overlap and diverge. In social media, such a distinction becomes important to substantiate Honneth’s recognition framework. Honneth regards recognition as ‘the fundamental overarching moral category’[30] but the affinity to social media sites cannot be adequately explained through such a framework because people sign up in greater numbers despite the risk of moral injury. People are not just lured to social media sites because of ‘recognition’ or determination of self-identity and moral worth. Along with recognition, social media also ensures redistribution. It presents an equal opportunity for people to become ‘insta-famous’ or ‘influencers’ through which one can be subject to economic gains and can monetize their talents. This becomes an opportunity for many sections of society who were earlier on the periphery to earn and make a living along with gaining ‘friends’ and ‘followers.’ If recognition is really about justice (Fraser) or identity (Honneth) how can the voluntary entry of individuals to these social media sites be explained because neither of these theories can adequately explain such actions? Fraser’s ‘status model’[31] could prove to be useful in such instances because it addresses problems of reification of identities as well as displacement of redistribution.
As I have addressed the problem of mimesis of character traits by individuals on social media, this also poses a problem of producing homogenised subjects wherein such sites wholly determine one’s self-identity. In this process, the ‘authentic self’[38] is lost, and the Honnethian question of self-esteem loses ground because the unique capabilities of individuals are no longer recognised.
Honneth does not ignore the dimension of redistribution of material needs but reiterates that such demands are a part of questions of recognition. Since social media has attained a degree of common sense in today’s day and age, such dimensions of moral justice and self-identification should be addressed on these platforms but they remain unaddressed. Despite hate comments and hate speech prevalent on social media sites causing moral injury, more and more people are lured to these social media sites. Both Fraser and Honneth endorse liberal values of ‘equal autonomy and moral worth of human beings’[32], and equal opportunities are presented through social media to curate one’s self-image in relation to others. But as interpellated subjects, we often overlook the implication of false consciousness mediated through these social media sites. One might think that these sites help them exercise autonomy and agency while enabling ‘participative parity,’[33] while in reality each post or the content presented on social media sites has been carefully curated through functional algorithms. Thus, the recognition framework alone cannot explain such a large-scale affinity towards these sites. Lois McNay’s critique of the Hegelian recognition framework in ‘Against Recognition’ addresses such shortcomings.[34] She argues that “Hegelian recognition theories fail to acknowledge the centrality of power in intersubjective relationships and tend to ‘naturalize particular accounts of subject formation.’[35] This raises an important question of the power of social media in the interpellation of subjects. McNay mentions that recognition theorists drawing from Hegelian notions of recognition fail to “understand how relations of power are always already present as the individual psyche is formed.”[36] Foucault’s recasting of civil society as the “paradigmatic terrain for the disciplinary deployments of power in modern society”[37] is a fitting description of social media in contemporary times. As I have addressed the problem of mimesis of character traits by individuals on social media, this also poses a problem of producing homogenised subjects wherein such sites wholly determine one’s self-identity. In this process, the ‘authentic self’[38] is lost, and the Honnethian question of self-esteem loses ground because the unique capabilities of individuals are no longer recognised.
Another motivation for using social media is ‘communication’ with others. Social media makes it easier to maintain relationships and form new bonds expanding one’s social network. An individual is not limited to ‘bonding social capital’ but is provided with a platform to enhance one’s ‘bridging social capital’[39]. This exposes one to diverse perspectives on a matter and can have egalitarian consequences. This interaction is not limited to a certain class hence people befriend or follow people from different classes. Through social media, one can follow their superiors at work and interact with celebrities who, through print media, were unreachable. Social media is seen as a platform for the subversion of institutionalised patterns of ‘misrecognition’[40]. It provides a space to break free from parity-impeding practices, especially for minorities who are often overlooked when group identities are considered. Fraser’s status model moves beyond recognition in terms of group identities, “rather, it means a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognised party as a full member of a society, capable of participating on a par with the rest.”[41] Social media, in this case, becomes a source of liberation and a point of attraction for many who, under real-life conditions could believe to have no power or agency. One necessarily does not stop to think their conversations and photos could be used as data by people sitting at the centre of the panopticon (the State), but they want to enjoy the momentary exercise of power or the feeling of being equals. In other words, such sites provide escapism from their real social conditions.
Positive recognition on social media platforms in the form of validation, appreciation, and support can bolster self-esteem and self-identification and at the same time absence of recognition or misrecognition can lead to feelings of insignificance, low esteem, and a diminished sense of moral worth. The pressure of external validation can also lead to the inauthenticity of the self, wherein one’s self-identity loses its sui generis qualities to morph into just another subject through mimesis of trends on social media.
Social media is a ‘morbid symptom’ of the capitalist interregnum.[42] Firstly, positive recognition on social media platforms in the form of validation, appreciation, and support can bolster self-esteem and self-identification and at the same time absence of recognition or misrecognition can lead to feelings of insignificance, low esteem, and a diminished sense of moral worth. The pressure of external validation can also lead to the inauthenticity of the self, wherein one’s self-identity loses its sui generis qualities to morph into just another subject through mimesis of trends on social media. This could prove to be alienating. Secondly, “by idealizing relations of recognition, the significance of relations of power is crucially underplayed.”[43] The moulding of one’s self-identity on these platforms is subject to everyday practices of power relations wherein subject formation takes place on a global scale. One portrays a sense of self that is accepted and validated by their social media community seeking external validation. In addition, the existence of anonymous profiles makes such a phenomenon even murkier to examine because the Honnethian or the Taylorian framework is limited to intersubjective recognition that happens face to face. Thirdly, “such theories of recognition fail to understand the intricacies of the links between identity and agency.”[44] Thompson’s reading of McNay’s Against Recognition claims that such recognition theories do not appreciate the complexities of what McNay drawing from Bourdieu, calls ‘embodied agency’. In the context of social media and communication technologies, Olivier Driessens and Torgeir Uberg Nærland propose ‘mediated recognition’[45] which could be a useful framework to examine recognition in the age of social media and an important addition to the critical theory framework. Such a framework is cognizant of the changing relationship of recognition wherein mediation is not seen as a neutral process but one that is power-laden. They define mediated recognition as “recognition through, by, and in media and communication technologies.”[46] They try and account for the numerous ways in which media and communication technologies can shape recognition and provide a platform for recognition struggles.
In conclusion, critical theory provides a toolkit to examine self-identity and moral worth in the age of social media. The framework of recognition proposed by Hegelian Marxists like Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth along with Weberian Marxist Nancy Fraser’s analytical distinction between redistribution and recognition lay the foundation for examining intersubjective recognition in the age of social media. However, some inadequacies prop up while implementing such a framework to analyse self-identity and moral worth in the age of social media. Such frameworks need to be updated by addressing the anxieties mentioned by McNay in Against Recognition and Feldman, who brings in the element of politics in the Fraserian redistribution-recognition dilemma. Frameworks like ‘mediated recognition’[47] could also substantiate the arguments posed by critical theorists in examining self-identity, self-worth and moral recognition in the age of social media.
Sneha Roy is Research Intern at CSPS
References:
[1] Judith Butler, (1993), Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex, Routledge.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Louis Althusser, (1970), Transcribed by Andy Blunden, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Ideology, and Ideological State Apparatus: notes towards an Investigation, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm
[4] Jean-Paul Sartre, (1960), Critique of Dialectical Reason.
[5] Axel Honneth, (Spring 1997). Recognition and Moral Obligation, Social Research, Volume 64, No.1.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Nancy Fraser, (2008), Adding Insult to Injury: Nancy Fraser Debates Her Critics, Edited by Kevin Olsen, Verso Press.
[10] Axel Honneth, (Spring 1997). Recognition and Moral Obligation, Social Research, Volume 64, No.1.
Here Honneth refers to Avishai Margalit’s (The Decent Society, 1996) reading of ‘desirable features’ in a negative manner i.e., identifying those institutional practices by means of which moral subjects justifiably see themselves injured and humiliated. Hence instances of bullying, hate speech, and body shaming on social media could be outlined as negative ‘desirable features’.
[11]Axel Honneth, (Spring 1997). Recognition and Moral Obligation, Social Research, Volume 64, No.1.
[12] C.F. Zurn, (2015), Axel Honneth. Cambridge, UK: Polity, pp6-7
[13] Charles Taylor, (1992), The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition (pp. 25–73). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[14] Olivier Driessens and Torgeir Uberg Nærland, (2022) “Mediated recognition: Identity, respect, and social justice in a changing media environment” Communications 47, no. 4: pp 505 -515. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2022-0068
[15] Axel Honneth, (1995[1992]). “The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts”. Oxford: Polity.
[16] Such movements were only successful because it did not attack the state directly but different patriarchal dimensions of the state which demanded legal recognition of such moral injuries. Social media sites do have a subversive potential, but it is circumscribed by governmentality.
[17] Asef Bayat, (2013), “Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East”, Stanford University Press, ISBN: 9780804783262.
[18] See Kiruba Munuswamy on Caste and the Me Too movement, India Culture Lab, Feb 27, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BmHCPSfkfzQ&t=5s
[19] Nivedita Menon, (2017) Statement by feminists on Facebook campaign to, “Name and Shame”, Kafila, October 24.
[20] Nancy Fraser, (2000), “Rethinking Recognition”, New Left Review.
[21] Simon Thompson, (2005), “Is redistribution a form of recognition? Comments on the Fraser–Honneth debate.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8(1), 85–102, https://doi.org/10.1080/136982304200033587610.1080/1369823042000335876
[22] Diana Coole, (1993), Constructing and Deconstructing Liberty: A Feminist and Poststructuralist Analysis, Political Studies Association, Blackwell Publishers.
[23] Leonard C. Feldman, (2002), Redistribution, Recognition, And the State, The Irreducibly Political Dimension of Injustice, Grinnell College, Political Theory, Sage Publications, -While Fraser expresses anxieties over the ‘displacement of redistribution’, Feldman addresses his anxieties over ‘displacement of politics’. He presents a trivalent framework as opposed to Fraser’s bivalent framework to include political exclusion in addition to maldistribution and misrecognition.
[24] Ibid. Although to be fair, Fraser does address this problem in her NLR article Rethinking Recognition (2000) wherein she draws inspiration from Weber’s framework of distinction between Class, Status, Party wherein Party represents the dimension of the political.
[25] Michel Foucault. [1979(1978)], Collège de France lecture series Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics.
[26] Nancy, Fraser. (1995), From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a ‘post-socialist’ age. New Left Review, 1(212), 68–93.
[27] Axel Honneth, (Spring, 1997), Recognition and Moral Obligation, Social Research, Volume 64, No.1.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Axel Honneth, (Spring, 1997), Recognition and Moral Obligation, Social Research, Volume 64, No.1.
[31] Fraser being a Weberian Marxist posits in Rethinking Recognition (2000), NLR the ‘status-model’ which ensures participative parity. It does not valorize group specificity but rather allows for deconstructive recognition as well as affirmative recognition of difference.
[32] Simon Thompson, (2005), “Is redistribution a form of recognition? Comments on the Fraser–Honneth debate.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8(1), 85–102, https://doi.org/10.1080/136982304200033587610.1080/1369823042000335876
[33] Nancy, Fraser. (1995), From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a ‘post-socialist’ age. New Left Review, 1(212), Pp68–93.
[34] Olivier Driessens and Torgeir Uberg Nærland, (2022) “Mediated recognition: Identity, respect, and social justice in a changing media environment” Communications 47, no. 4: pp 505 -515. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2022-0068
[35] Lois McNay, (2008), “Against Recognition”, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp195, ISBN: 978-0745629325
[36] Simon Thompson, (2008), Review of McNay, Lois. “Against Recognition”, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp195, ISBN: 978-0745629325
[37] Leonard C. Feldman, (2002), Redistribution, Recognition, And the State, The Irreducibly Political Dimension of Injustice, Grinnell College, Political Theory, Sage Publications.
[38] Charles Taylor, (1992), The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition (pp. 25–73). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[39] Robert D Putnam, (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
[40]Nancy Fraser, (2000), “Rethinking Recognition”, New Left Review.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Gilbert Achcar, (2022), “Morbid Symptoms: What Did Gramsci Really Mean?”, Notebooks: The Journal for Studies on Power 1, 2 (2022): 379-387, doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/26667185-01020010
[43] Simon Thompson, (2008), Review of McNay, Lois. “Against Recognition”, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp195, ISBN: 978-0745629325
[44] Ibid.
[45] Olivier Driessens and Torgeir Uberg Nærland, (2022) “Mediated recognition: Identity, respect, and social justice in a changing media environment” Communications 47, no. 4: pp 505 -515. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2022-0068
[46] Ibid.
[47] Olivier Driessens and Torgeir Uberg Nærland, (2022) “Mediated recognition: Identity, respect, and social justice in a changing media environment” Communications 47, no. 4: pp 505 -515. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2022-0068
