After the 2023 Assembly elections in Karnataka, it is essential to move beyond the surface-level observations and narratives constructed by political parties and the media. By delving into the nature of the victories and defeats of various parties, we can gain a deeper understanding of the outcomes. This election held particular significance for the people of Karnataka and the country for multiple reasons.
The crucial question that emerged from this election was whether the electorate in Karnataka had grown weary of the Hindutva-centric politics that had unfolded over the past four years. The outcome would reveal whether the people rejected the divisive politics associated with Hindutva. Alternatively, it would test the effectiveness of the Bhartiya Janta Party’s (BJP) strategy of communal polarisation, orchestrated by the duo of Modi and Shah, combined with their financial prowess and micro-level social engineering. The election would also show whether dissatisfaction with misgovernance, corruption, inflation, unemployment, and other issues impacting people’s lives and livelihoods would outweigh the BJP’s politics. Another significant aspect of the election was whether the dominant Lingayat community would abandon the BJP due to perceived systematic humiliation. Additionally, it was important to determine whether the SC-ST communities recognised the BJP’s alleged deception regarding reservation policies, including the increase in reservation quotas and their reclassification.
It appears Karnataka was an easy choice for the people due to certain factors. Firstly, according to a World Bank report from two years ago, Karnataka ranked as the most corrupt state in India. Additionally, over the past five years, it became evident that the BJP’s governance had been severely lacking in terms of corruption, local service delivery, and candidate selection, with a reported corruption rate of 40 per cent. Consequently, one could argue that this vote reflected the people’s dissatisfaction with the BJP’s governance policies. However, this raises the question of what happened to the BJP’s agenda of communal polarisation. What does the outcome of this election signify in that regard? Does it indicate a sudden exception or a change in circumstances? Here the role of Eddelu Karnataka comes into the picture.
In the context of social and political dynamics in Karnataka, several social and political mobilisations took place outside the electoral sphere. A significant story emerged in Karnataka involving Civil Social organisations that played a pivotal role. Over 100 organisations united under the program Eddelu Karnataka (Wake up Karnataka), where the caste question was raised. They conducted 250 workshops and deployed 110 teams comprising 5000 volunteers who worked tirelessly day and night. These teams conducted a survey of 41 thousand families and distributed 10 lakh copies of free literature opposing the BJP. They also persuaded 29 candidates from smaller parties to withdraw from the contest to prevent the division of opposition votes.
These Civil Society organisations independently reached out to Kisan (farmer) and labour movements, Dalit politics, students, and others. They had a presence in all 31 districts of Karnataka. While the Congress party did not possess a strong organisational presence, this Civil Society organisation played a significant but hidden role, contributing to the electoral outcome. Therefore, what makes Karnataka particularly interesting is the emergence of a transfer of social mobilisation into political results for the first time.
Analysing the Electoral Mandate
Following the conclusive Assembly elections in Karnataka, the Congress party has emerged as the clear winner, securing a comfortable and secure majority with 135 seats in the 224-member Assembly. This represents a 70-seat advantage over the BJP, accompanied by a 7 per cent higher vote share for the Congress. The immediate challenge of determining the Chief Minister has been sorted through a viable arrangement, appointing Siddaramaiah as the Chief Minister and DK Shivakumar as the Deputy Chief Minister. However, a more in-depth analysis of the election results highlights that while Congress can form a stable government for the next five years, this victory alone cannot be interpreted as a definitive defeat of communalism or the BJP.
In the 2023 elections, the Congress witnessed a rise in its vote share, reaching 43 per cent, which signifies a five per cent increase compared to the 2018 figures. Conversely, the Janata Dal (Secular) [JD (S)] experienced a decline, losing approximately 18 seats and a five per cent vote share in 2023 . However, it is noteworthy that the BJP, despite winning only 66 seats and suffering a loss of 40 seats compared to the 2018 outcome, has garnered its vote share at 36 per cent, identical to that of the previous election. A more detailed analysis of the absolute numbers will provide further clarity on the situation.
However, it is crucial to note that the issue-based support for Congress in this context is driven by sectarian interests, focusing primarily on specific concerns rather than broader political issues. Additionally, the RSS has successfully culturally and socially penetrated Lambani society with its Hindutva politics. At the same time, Congress and other secular entities lack a comprehensive counter-cultural and social strategy. Therefore, the disassociation of Lambanis from the Sangh Parivar might be temporary.
BJP Witnesses an Upward Surge in Vote Count
In the 2018 elections, the BJP gained 13.2 million votes, while the Indian National Congress received 13.9 million. However, in the recent election, the Congress witnessed an increase of 2.7 million votes, reaching a total of 16.7 million. In contrast, the JD(S)) received the support of 6.7 million voters in 2018, which decreased to 5.2 million in the current election, resulting in a decline in JD(S)’s vote share from 18.36 per cent to 13.3 per cent. On the other hand, in 2023, the BJP secured 14 million votes, indicating a gain of 0.8 million votes compared to the previous election. This signifies that the BJP maintained its 2018 vote share and attracted additional votes. While such micro-level vote share details may not hold substantial importance within the First Past the Post System model of electoral democracy, they provide insights into a party’s social support dynamics. The fact that the BJP achieved this performance despite facing an anti-incumbency wave should be a cause for concern. Therefore, the jubilation surrounding the BJP’s defeat may be overstated, necessitating a close examination of the nature of the mandate.
The fact that the BJP achieved this performance despite facing an anti-incumbency wave should be a cause for concern. Therefore, the jubilation surrounding the BJP’s defeat may be overstated, necessitating a close examination of the nature of the mandate
Dakshina Kannada, widely recognised as a stronghold of Hindutva ideology in Karnataka, has been identified as another region with communal tensions, as acknowledged by the state government in September 2022. While the BJP experienced a marginal decrease of 2.7 per cent in its vote share, this outcome can be attributed to the aggressive reaction of Hindutva activists towards what they perceived as a moderate stance by their party leaders. This was particularly evident in the Puttur constituency, where the Congress candidate, who had defected from the aggressive Hindutva faction, joined forces with a rebel candidate from the Hindutva activists, resulting in their victory over the BJP candidate. Despite Congress securing victories in other constituencies such as Ullal, the reduced vote share of the BJP only impacted their victory margins. It is essential to recognise that the Congress victory in Puttur or other BJP victories with reduced vote share should not be misconstrued as a mandate for secularism but rather as an expression of the assertive Hindutva ideology prevalent in the region.
In Vijayapura, a region known for its communal tensions in Kittur Karnataka, Basavanagouda Yatnal, a prominent spokesperson for Hindutva ideology, emerged victorious in the elections, securing 93,326 votes. This represents an increase of 15,000 votes compared to his performance in 2018, accompanied by a higher margin of 4,000 votes.
The central Karnataka region experienced the largest decline in votes for the BJP. This area holds significant influence from Lambanis and Madigas, who form a substantial portion of the Scheduled Caste (SC) and other Scheduled Tribe (ST) electorate. As previously discussed, the steadfast support of Lambanis and the dissatisfaction of Madigas regarding the reservation reclassification issue contributed to an 8.2% decrease in BJP’s vote share in this region. Conversely, Congress witnessed an 8% gain in vote share.
However, it is crucial to note that the issue-based support for Congress in this context is driven by sectarian interests, focusing primarily on specific concerns rather than broader political issues. Additionally, the RSS has successfully culturally and socially penetrated Lambani society with its Hindutva politics. At the same time, Congress and other secular entities lack a comprehensive counter-cultural and social strategy. Therefore, the disassociation of Lambanis from the Sangh Parivar might be temporary.
In Bengaluru metropolitan region, encompassing 28 constituencies, the BJP has experienced a 5.4 per cent increase in vote share, rising from 35.8 per cent to 41.2 per cent. Notably, the BJP’s vote share in this region surpasses the Congress’s by one per cent. These observations highlight the complex interplay of communal dynamics, sectarian interests, and political affiliations, underscoring the need for a comprehensive understanding of the electoral landscape.
An examination of the BJP’s electoral history reveals a consistent increase in its vote share since 1989, following a linear trajectory. The party’s vote share stood at 4.14 per cent in 1989, 16.99 per cent in the 1994 elections, 20.69 per cent in 1999, 28.33 per cent in 2004, 33.86 per cent in 2008, and remained at 36 per cent in both 2018 and 2023. Regardless of the BJP’s electoral fortunes, it has managed to cement its social base, distinguishing itself from other parties, including the Congress. This poses a significant challenge for secular forces, highlighting the need for vigilance and avoiding complacency in the Congress’ victory. The additional seven per cent votes secured by the Congress in this election appear to be more of a conditional agreement based on the guarantees offered, lacking ideological or political cohesion that would bind voters to the party, unlike the BJP’s social base. This becomes evident when comparing Congress’ performance in a similar situation. The decline of the Congress in the late 1990s was attributed, in part, to the dissatisfaction of the dominant Lingayat community. Similarly, the BJP’s defeat in 2023 is associated with Lingayat discontent. However, comparing the two scenarios suggests that the BJP navigated the crisis relatively unharmed, possibly due to its Hindutva-centric politics.
An examination of the BJP’s electoral history reveals a consistent increase in its vote share since 1989, following a linear trajectory. The party’s vote share stood at 4.14 per cent in 1989, 16.99 per cent in the 1994 elections, 20.69 per cent in 1999, 28.33 per cent in 2004, 33.86 per cent in 2008, and remained at 36 per cent in both 2018 and 2023. Regardless of the BJP’s electoral fortunes, it has managed to cement its social base, distinguishing itself from other parties, including the Congress
Lingayats and the Congress
The Hyderabad Karnataka region comprises predominantly SC, ST, and OBC communities. In this region, people frequently migrate for work, and the overall backwardness of the area has not significantly improved over the years. Unlike other parts of Karnataka, where the Sangh Parivar could easily garner support from oppressive caste communities, such a base does not exist here.
The Sangh Parivar initially succeeded in coastal Karnataka, where its early leadership consisted of Goud Saraswat Brahmins. It also established deep roots among the dominant Lingayat communities in northern Karnataka’s Belagavi and Dharwad regions, aided by local Brahmins. In Kalyana Karnataka, where the Sangh’s influence is only beginning to emerge, its electoral support relies heavily on individual leaders. It has not yet translated into cultural influence or the propagation of Islamophobia.
In the ongoing struggle to undo and redo the state’s social engineering, the most underrepresented groups are in a similar position. The RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has been visibly re-engineering backward communities with limited economic and political influence. However, its success in reshaping the state’s most influential community, the Lingayats, who served as their entry point into Karnataka, is not well understood.
In 2020, the central government introduced the New Education Policy, requesting each state government to establish focus groups to study educational institutions and propose successful models. Lingayat organisations own over a thousand educational institutions in Karnataka, reflecting their historical commitment to providing equal education to all, as envisioned by Basavanna. However, Karnataka’s focus group recommendations for the NEP disregarded these practices. Instead, they referenced the Vedas, suggesting teaching methods aligned with Vidya Bharathi and Rasthtrothana schools, both directly affiliated with the RSS. This disregard for the community’s significant contributions to the state’s cultural and historical enrichment is particularly noteworthy at a time when the state has a Lingayat chief minister representing a party associated with Lingayat power.
Furthermore, in the context of the 2023 elections, the removal of Yediyurappa, a prominent leader of the Lingayat community and successor to Veerendra Patil, from the Chief Minister position in a disrespectful manner, along with the denial of a ticket to another leader, Jagadish Shettar, and the lack of respect shown to Laxman Savadi, has created a situation resembling that of the past. Many BJP leaders have openly expressed their stance against continued appeasement of the Lingayat community, indicating a potential significant desertion of Lingayat support from the BJP. It is important to note these circumstances and draw parallels between the historical context of Lingayat discontent against the Congress in the 1990s and the current situation, where a similar discontent among the Lingayat community towards the BJP could result in significant political ramifications.
When examining the region-wise vote share of the BJP, it is evident that there was a marginal decline of only 3.5 per cent in Lingayat-dominated Kittur Karnataka and 2.6 per cent in Kalyana Karnataka. However, this reduction cannot be solely attributed to Lingayat’s apathy. This time, the Lambani and Madiga communities, who had previously voted for the BJP against the Congress in recent elections, shifted their allegiance for multiple reasons. Particularly, the Lambanis were dissatisfied with the BJP government’s recommendation to reclassify Scheduled Caste (SC) reservations, which caused dismay among touchable castes within the SC quota.
Lingayat Voting Patterns in 2023: Assessing the Alleged Desertion of the BJP
However, the electoral mandate and its regional breakdown do not indicate a significant abandonment of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) by the Lingayat community. Firstly, the party’s overall vote share remains unchallenged at 36%. Secondly, various surveys and post-poll studies indicate that Congress garnered support from rural populations, the impoverished, women, Dalits, Adivasis, and Muslims. However, the BJP managed to maintain its vote share among forward castes and dominant groups like the Lingayats and even experienced an increase in vote share among the Vokkaligas in southern Karnataka.
When examining the region-wise vote share of the BJP, it is evident that there was a marginal decline of only 3.5 per cent in Lingayat-dominated Kittur Karnataka and 2.6 per cent in Kalyana Karnataka. However, this reduction cannot be solely attributed to Lingayat’s apathy. This time, the Lambani and Madiga communities, who had previously voted for the BJP against the Congress in recent elections, shifted their allegiance for multiple reasons. Particularly, the Lambanis were dissatisfied with the BJP government’s recommendation to reclassify Scheduled Caste (SC) reservations, which caused dismay among touchable castes within the SC quota. The voting preferences of the Lambanis potentially influenced more than 63 constituencies, particularly in north Karnataka. Similarly, the Madigas, who would typically lean towards the BJP over Congress, also expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed formula put forth by the BJP government.
Additionally, the defeat of Jagadish Shettar, a prominent Lingayat leader who joined the Congress due to perceived humiliation just prior to the election, by a significant margin of over 35,000 votes at the hands of Mahesh Tenginkai, a young Lingayat BJP candidate and a former follower of Shettar, further suggests that the Lingayat community largely remained loyal to the BJP. Even the post-poll survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) implies that the Lingayats, despite facing similar humiliation as in 1994, largely maintained their support for the BJP. This can be attributed to the Hindutva ideology permeating the social, spiritual, and political elites, which has deeply impacted the masses.
In the case of Udupi, Yashpal Suvarna from the BJP, who played a role in fuelling the hijab issue, secured a resounding victory with a substantial margin of 33,000 votes, which was 20,000 votes more than their margin in 2018. In south Karnataka, the BJP and the Sangh Parivar made concerted efforts to polarise the electorate along communal lines, employing tactics such as the hijab issue and tarnishing the image of Tipu Sultan through incidents like the Uri Gowda and Nanje Gowda controversy.
The Case of Udupi and Srirangpatna
Noteworthy incidents of communal tension in Srirangapatna, particularly surrounding a mosque, and the hijab crisis in Udupi have garnered significant attention. Analysing the performance of the BJP in these constituencies can provide insights into the nature of the mandate in the 2023 elections. A comparative study of the BJP’s vote share in 2018 and 2023 within these constituencies can offer a clearer understanding of the situation.
In the case of Udupi, Yashpal Suvarna from the BJP, who played a role in fuelling the hijab issue, secured a resounding victory with a substantial margin of 33,000 votes, which was 20,000 votes more than their margin in 2018. In south Karnataka, the BJP and the Sangh Parivar made concerted efforts to polarise the electorate along communal lines, employing tactics such as the hijab issue and tarnishing the image of Tipu Sultan through incidents like the Uri Gowda and Nanje Gowda controversy.
Srirangapatna, the historic capital of Tipu Sultan’s rule, has witnessed significant communal polarisation instigated by the Hindutva forces’ mainstream and fringe elements. The focus of this polarisation revolved around the reclamation of a Hanuman temple, allegedly converted into a mosque during Tipu Sultan’s reign. Traditionally, the BJP has had limited electoral strength in the Vokkaliga-dominated south Karnataka region, including Srirangapatna. In the 2018 elections, the BJP secured a mere 11,241 votes in this constituency. However, following their relentless communal campaign, the BJP secured 42,079 votes in the 2023 elections, nearly quadrupling their previous vote share.
Similarly, in Melukote, an important constituency with a strong presence of the farmers’ movement and located adjacent to Srirangapatna, a candidate from the Sarvodaya Karnataka Paksha, an offshoot of the Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha (KRRS), emerged victorious with a margin of 10,000 votes over the JD(S) candidate. Notably, the BJP experienced a six-fold increase in their vote share in this constituency, rising from 1,587 votes to 6,378 votes. This region, which had not previously witnessed significant communal polarisation, has observed a worrisome 4 per cent increase in the BJP’s vote share.
An examination of these specific constituencies sheds light on the electoral impact of communal polarisation and its repercussions on the BJP’s performance. A more comprehensive understanding of the prevailing political climate can be attained by scrutinising the dynamics within these areas.
In the neighbouring Bhadravathi constituency, which experienced communal tensions related to the hijab and halal issues, the BJP traditionally had minimal influence. The electoral contest in this constituency primarily involved the Congress and the JD(S), with BJP votes rarely exceeding 10,000. However, in the recent election, the BJP witnessed a threefold increase in their vote share, rising from 8,866 votes to 21,014 votes, even though the Congress candidate emerged as the winner with a reduced margin. This surge in BJP votes signifies a notable shift in the political landscape of Bhadravathi, potentially influenced by communal sentiments and the BJP’s Hindutva agenda.
Shivamogga: Hindutva Frenzy Rewarded Once Again
Examining the electoral dynamics in Shivamogga district provides valuable insights into whether the electorate punished the BJP for alleged corruption and misgovernance or supported its Hindutva politics. Notably, the district witnessed over 57 communal incidents, prompting analysis of the voting patterns in response to these issues.
KS Eshwarappa, a former cabinet minister in the BJP government, had become synonymous with corruption in the state. Despite being denied a ticket in the recent election, the BJP candidate, who was relatively less popular, managed to secure a similar vote share of 95,399 votes. In comparison, Eshwarappa, who was more widely recognised and held seniority, polled only 5,000 votes more in 2018. This raises questions about whether the electorate overlooked the allegations of corruption and extended their support to the BJP candidate due to other factors, potentially including the party’s Hindutva politics.
In the neighbouring Bhadravathi constituency, which experienced communal tensions related to the hijab and halal issues, the BJP traditionally had minimal influence. The electoral contest in this constituency primarily involved the Congress and the JD(S), with BJP votes rarely exceeding 10,000. However, in the recent election, the BJP witnessed a threefold increase in their vote share, rising from 8,866 votes to 21,014 votes, even though the Congress candidate emerged as the winner with a reduced margin. This surge in BJP votes signifies a notable shift in the political landscape of Bhadravathi, potentially influenced by communal sentiments and the BJP’s Hindutva agenda.
By exploring these specific constituencies, we gain valuable insights into whether the electorate in Shivamogga district condemned the BJP for allegations of corruption and misgovernance or, alternatively, supported the party due to its Hindutva ideology. Analysing voting patterns in these areas contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics in the electoral landscape.
The electoral mandate in Karnataka cannot be interpreted as a decisive rejection of communal politics. Rather, it reflects the public’s frustration with the BJP government’s governance failures, including perceived mismanagement and rising prices. Consequently, a significant portion of the rural and impoverished population has opted for an electoral agreement based on specific assurances. Furthermore, strategic voting patterns were observed among the Muslim and Scheduled Caste (SC) communities, who cast their ballots against the BJP. However, support from other sections of society may wane if Congress fails to fulfil its promised commitments
Neoliberal Contract, Congress Guarantees, and the Looming Hindutva: An Examination of the Political Landscape
The electoral mandate in Karnataka cannot be interpreted as a decisive rejection of communal politics. Rather, it reflects the public’s frustration with the BJP government’s governance failures, including perceived mismanagement and rising prices. Consequently, a significant portion of the rural and impoverished population has opted for an electoral agreement based on specific assurances. Furthermore, strategic voting patterns were observed among the Muslim and Scheduled Caste (SC) communities, who cast their ballots against the BJP. However, support from other sections of society may wane if Congress fails to fulfil its promised commitments.
One significant crisis that has emerged is the neoliberal crisis, which opposition parties have not fully addressed to move beyond transactional welfarism despite its evident impact over the past decade. To counter the prevailing majoritarian psyche in India, a shift towards a robust structural welfare is essential. Opposition parties should advocate for implementing universal health policies, common neighbourhood schooling policies, and initiatives such as the Nyaya scheme, introduced by the Congress party to provide a basic income. If the opposition can offer something more substantial, something that can genuinely transform people’s lives at a structural level, it is more likely to capture the attention and support of the population.
Furthermore, even when addressing corruption issues, the Congress party has primarily focused on highlighting alleged demands of commissions from religious institutions, criticising the BJP for “polluting religious sanctity.” However, they have not delved into the underlying reasons for funding these institutions in the first place. The problem with the opposition’s discourse is that while they critique the BJP-RSS alliance regarding cultural politics, their stance on economic policies remains unchanged. The only discernible difference is that the BJP tends to adopt a more aggressive approach, often disregarding the rule of law and showing scant regard for human rights and the separation of powers.
What opposition parties consistently fail to acknowledge is that the BJP’s projection of a Hinduised cultural nationalism is likely to persist. Merely avoiding or mimicking the saffron party’s rhetoric may bring short-term success at the expense of the region’s long-term future.
Dikshant Gehlot is a Research Intern at CSPS.
